In large-scale client-client communication environments, Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) based on trusted server is very convenient in key management. For enhancing the efficiency and preventing various attacks, Wang and Mo proposed a three-PAKE protocol, Yoon and Yoo proposed a C2C-PAKE protocol. However, in this paper, we show that the Wang-Mo protocol and the Yoon-Yoo protocol exist impersonation attack.
Introduction
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) enables two communication entities to authenticate each other and establish a session key via easily memorable passwords. The first PAKE protocol was introduced by Bellovin and Merritt in 1992 [1] 
known as Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE).
Two-party password-based authenticated key exchange (two-PAKE) protocol is quite useful for client-server architectures. However, in large-scale client-client communication environments where a user wants to communicate with many other users, Two-PAKE protocol is very inconvenient in key management that the number of passwords that the user would need to remember. Gong, Lomas, Needham, and Saltzer [3] proposed a three-party password-based key transfer protocol using server's public key. Later, Steiner, Tsudik and Waider [7] proposed a three-party PAKE (three-PAKE) protocol between two clients without server's public key. Recently, Lee et al. [5] proposed an efficient three-PAKE protocol. Wang and Mo [8] show that Lee et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the impersonation attack. Wang and Mo also proposed an improved method to withstand this attack.
To provide a cross-realm authentication, where clients from one environment (realm) wish to communicate with clients from other realms, Byun et al. [2] presented a Client-to-Client Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (C2C-PAKE) protocol. Kim et al. [4] showed that the C2C-PAKE scheme is vulnerable to a Denning-Sacco-style attack where the attacker is an insider with knowledge of the password of a client in a different realm. Kim et al. also proposed an improved C2C-PAKE protocol. Recently, Yoon and Yoo [9] demonstrated that Kim et al.'s C2C-PAKE protocol is vulnerable to one-way man-in-the-middle attack and password-compromise impersonation attack. Yoon and Yoo also presented an enhancement to resolve these problems.
In this paper, we show that the Wang-Mo protocol and the Yoon-Yoo protocol exist impersonation attack. 
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Cryptanalysis
We show that the Wang-Mo Protocol exists the impersonation attack (see Figure  2) . Once Alice's verifier v A has stolen by the attacker. The attacker can impersonate Bob to communicate with Alice by performing the following steps.
(1)* When Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Alice sends the identity A and X A = g a to Bob. Eve intercepts it.
(2)* Eve chooses a random number b ∈ R Z p * and sends X B = g to Alice. 
t A = H(A, S, pwa) v A = g H(A, S, pwa)
A, 
where ) is used as Alice and Bob's common secret session key.
Cryptanalysis
Suppose Alice's password is disclosed. Obviously, an adversary who knows this secret password can impersonate Alice to other entities. However, it is desired that this disclosure does not allow the adversary to impersonate other entities to Alice. We show the Yoon-Yoo protocol is also vulnerable to this impersonation attack (see Figure 4) . The attack works as follows.
(1)* When Eve comprises pwa, she is able to get g x form intercepted M 1 . ) and masquerade as Bob to complete the protocol. In the end, Eve would successfully authenticate itself to Alice as Bob, and also share a secret session key with Alice, but all the while Alice thinking it is sharing a key with Bob. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a cryptanalysis of two password-authenticated key exchange protocols newly published. Our results show that once Alice's verifier (or password) has stolen by the attacker, the attacker can impersonate another client to communicate with Alice.
